Building a House of Legal Rights: A Plea for the Homeless by Ciampi, Maria L.
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 59 
Number 3 Volume 59, Spring 1985, Number 3 Article 3 
June 2012 
Building a House of Legal Rights: A Plea for the Homeless 
Maria L. Ciampi 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Ciampi, Maria L. (1985) "Building a House of Legal Rights: A Plea for the Homeless," St. John's Law 
Review: Vol. 59 : No. 3 , Article 3. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol59/iss3/3 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
NOTES
BUILDING A HOUSE OF LEGAL RIGHTS:
A PLEA FOR THE HOMELESS
Today, hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions of Americans
are homeless,1 having only temporary housing in publicly or pri-
vately operated shelters or no housing at all.2 The causes of home-
lessness vary, and include deinstitutionalization, the reduction of
aid to the poor, the unavailability of low cost housing, and unem-
ployment.' The price of homelessness is high; beyond the problem
' See Schneider, Food Stamp Benefits and the Homeless, 18 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 31,
31 (1984). It is well recognized that it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine accurately
the number of homeless living in the United States. See Werner, On the Streets: Homeless-
ness Causes and Solutions, 18 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 11, 11 (1984); Brief for the National
Coalition for the Homeless as Amicus Curiae at 3, Clark v. Community for Creative Non-
Violence, 104 S. Ct. 3065 (1984). Some scholars and organizations have estimated that there
are approximately two million homeless persons in the United States. See Kimball, Home-
less and Hungry in Chicago, 18 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 18, 18 (1984) (between one and three
million homeless in America); Brief for the National Coalition for the Homeless as Amicus
Curiae at 3 & n.3, Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 104 S. Ct. 3065 (1984)
(estimating number of homeless to be between two and three million, based upon newsletter
by United States Department of Health and Human Services and estimates done by groups
working to help homeless). But see Schneider, supra, at 31 (number of homeless estimated
to be between 500,000 and 2,000,000).
2 See Collin, Homelessness: The Policy and the Law, 16 URB. LAW. 317, 317 (1984).
Two basic definitions of homelessness pervade the legal material in the area. See id. One
definition focuses on lack of residence-a homeless person is one "whose primary nighttime
residence is either in the publicly or privately operated shelters or in the streets, in the
doorways, train stations and bus terminals, public plazas and parks, subways, abandoned
buildings, loading docks and other well hidden sites known only to their users." Id. (citing
E. BAXTER & K. HOPPER, PRIVATE LIvES/PUBLIC SPACES: HOMELESS ADULTS ON THE STREETS
OF NEW YORK 6-7 (1981)). The second definition emphasizes the homeless individual's alien-
ation from society-homelessness is "a condition of detachment from society characterized
by the absence or attenuation of the affiliative bonds that link settled persons to a network
of interconnected social structures." Collin, supra, at 317 (citing H. BAHR, SKm Row, AN
INTRODUCTION TO DISAFFILIATION 17 (1973)). This Note adopts the "lack of residence" defini-
tion rather than the alienation definition.
3 See Brief for the National Coalition for the Homeless as Amicus Curiae at 9-14, Clark
v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 104 S. Ct. 3065 (1984). The major problems and
causes of homelessness are the deinstitutionalization of the mentally incapacitated, see id.
at 13-14; Rhoden, The Limits of Liberty: Deinstitutionalization, Homelessness and Liber-
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of insufficient shelter the homeless are confronted with legal barri-
ers preventing them from enjoying the benefits of our system of
government.
In addition to the deprivation of adequate shelter,4 an individ-
ual who lacks a fixed, permanent legal residence is also denied cer-
tain rights and privileges, such as voting5 and public assistance.'
The homeless are also threatened with criminal sanctions in states
and localities that have loitering statutes and ordinances. 7 More-
over, according to many adult protective services laws, a homeless
person can be compelled to remain in a shelter against his will."
The homeless need a political voice to challenge the conse-
quences of homelessness. 9 In the United States, the ability to vote
is a political voice through which one may preserve existing, and
obtain new, civil liberties.10 The franchise is particularly important
tarian Theory, 31 EMORY L.J. 375, 387-415 (1982); Werner, supra note 1, at 11, the reduc-
tion of aid to poor on both federal and state levels, see Brief for the National Coalition for
the Homeless as Amicus Curiae at 12-13, Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence,
104 S. Ct. 3065 (1984); see generally Price v. Cohen, 715 F.2d 87, 90 (3d Cir. 1983) (in
Pennsylvania, sources of public assistance either exhausted or inadequate), the unavailabil-
ity of low cost housing, see Brief for the National Coalition for the Homeless as Amicus
Curiae at 9-10, Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 104 S. Ct. 3065 (1984), and
loss of employment, Werner, supra note 1, at 12; see generally Price, 715 F.2d at 91 (needy
have difficulty finding work).
4 Homelessness in America, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 2, 1984.
1 See infra notes 93-123 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 15-41 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 42-54 and accompanying text.
8 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 415.101-415.112 (West Supp. 1984); Ky. REv. STAT. §§
209.010-209.160 (1982); N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 473-a (McKinney Supp. 1983); TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 14-25-101 to 14-25-113 (1980 & Supp. 1984); TEX. HUM REs. CODE ANN. § 48.061
(Vernon Supp. 1985). An adult protective services statute permits social agency officials or
police or peace officers to provide involuntary protective services to a defined class of needy
adults. See Note, Homelessness in a Modern Urban Setting, 10 FOEDHAM URB. L.J. 749,
773-78 (1982).
o Note, Establishing a Right to Shelter for the Homeless, 50 BROOKLYN L. REv. 939, 940
n.8 (1984) (homeless lack organization necessary to have political influence); see Clark v.
Community for Creative Non-Violence, 104 S. Ct. 3065, 3074 n.4 (1984) (Marshall, J., dis-
senting). Although the Supreme Court in Clark refused to recognize the first amendment
right of the homeless to protest their situation by sleeping in a park outside the White
House in contradiction to park rules, the dissent recognized that the homeless need political
power if they are to attain and preserve civil liberties. See Clark, 104 S. Ct. at 3077 n.4
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
1 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964). As a citizen of the United States, one
is guaranteed not only the basic civil liberties protected by the Constitution, but also the
ability to protect and procure additional civil liberties through his representation in govern-
ment. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667, 670 (1966); Reynolds, 377
U.S. at 561-62, 565.
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to the homeless because they lack other channels of political influ-
ence." In most states, however, homeless individuals have been de-
nied the right to vote because they have no "bona fide" residence. 2
On one hand, denial of the right to vote to those without shelter is
antithetical to the Supreme Court's strict scrutiny and frequent re-
jection of state economic regulations restricting access to the bal-
lot.13 On the other hand, the requirements of age, citizenship and
residence are considered so essential to state government that state
regulations imposing these restrictions have encountered the low-
est level of judicial scrutiny.14
1 See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 104 S. Ct. 3065, 3074 n.4 (1984)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (homeless lack financial resources necessary to make them viable
political force); Brief for the National Coalition for the Homeless as Amicus Curiae at 5,
Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 104 S. Ct. 3065 (1984) (homeless lack access
to sources of political influence including those of "publicity, moral pressure and an occa-
sional court decision").
12 See infra notes 93-99 and accompanying text. "Bona fide" residence requires, in
most states, that a person claiming to be a resident have a fixed legal permanent residence,
the intention to remain indefinitely in a state, and the desire to make that state his home.
See, e.g., MD. CONST. art. I, § 1 (see Gallagher v. Board of Supervisors of Elections, 219 Md.
19, 148 A.2d 390 (1959)); MIss. CONsT. art. XII, § 241 (amended 1972) (see Smith v. Deere,
195 Miss. 502, 16 So. 2d 33 (1943)); ALASKA STAT. § 15.05.020(2) (1982); CAL. ELEC. CODE §
200(b) (West 1977); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18:101 (West 1979 & Supp. 1985) (see Soileau v.
Board of Supervisors, 361 So. 2d 319 (La. 1978)); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 51, §§ 1, 1A (Michie/
Law. Coop. 1975 & Supp. 1984-1985); MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 168.11(a) (1970 & Supp. 1984-
1985); N.Y. ELEc. LAW § 1-104(22) (McKinney 1978). As of 1980, however, the bona fide
residence requirement was not the only means by which the homeless were denied the right
to vote; seven states by statute explicitly disenfranchised the homeless. See A. REITMAN & R
DAVIDSON, THE ELECTION PROCESS: LAW OF PUBLIC ELECTIONS AND ELECTION CAMPAIGNS 17-
18 (2d ed. 1980).
According to two commentators, the disenfranchisement of the homeless is rooted in a
"property-ownership notion" that a poor individual somehow is not capable of making an
intelligent decision. Id. at 17. A second reason for disenfranchisement proposed by these
commentators is the fear that indigent voters are "susceptible to bribery." Id.
Two state statutes that require "fixed, legal permanent residence," have recently been
challenged in federal district courts. See Pitts v. Black, No. 84 Civ. 5270 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10,
1984); Committee for the Dignity and Fairness for the Homeless v. Tartaglione, No. 84 Civ.
3447 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 14, 1984). In view of the recent decisions in New York City, Philadel-
phia and Washington D.C., see infra note 93, Reitman and Davidson may have been correct
in their forecast that "economic means tests as a condition for voting may be waning," A.
REITMAN & R. DAVIDSON, supra, at 17.
13 See, e.g., Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 718 (1974); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134,
144 (1972); Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204, 208-09 (1970); Cipriano v. City of Houma,
395 U.S. 701, 704-06 (1969); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966).
14 See Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289, 297 (1975) (dictum); Kramer v. Union Free School
Dist., 295 U.S. 621, 637-38 (1969) (Stewart, J., dissenting). The lowest standard of scrutiny
used by a court is the "rational basis test." See, e.g., McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 63, 70
(1973); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 73-74 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,
487 (1970). The rational basis test applies minimal scrutiny to state activities and laws,
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This Note will examine the various rights and privileges de-
nied to homeless persons and will describe and explain the legisla-
tive and judicial inactivity responsible for this denial. The need for
federal, state and local governments to ensure the right to vote for
the homeless will be highlighted, and this Note will suggest that
the voting requirement of "bona fide" residence should be subject
to the highest level of scrutiny by courts, requiring the redefinition
of state tests of "good faith" residence. Having established the
franchise as a source of political influence for the homeless, this
Note will conclude that recognition of the homeless as a voting
block could give rise to the establishment of a statutory right to
housing.
PUBLIC ASSISTANCE AND HOMELESSNESS
The federal, state and local governments provide a number of
relief programs that provide housing, medical assistance, food
stamps, and substitute or supplemental income to the poor.15
Among these programs are Aid to Families with Dependent Chil-
dren (AFDC),'6 Medicaid, Medicare," Food Stamps, 8 and Supple-
restricting only those that do not reasonably further a legitimate state interest. See San
Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973). This level of scrutiny is not
sufficiently rigorous to apply to most restrictions on fundamental rights such as voting. See
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964). Contra Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383
U.S. 663, 676 (1986) (Black, J., dissenting). Nonetheless, there is little case law that ques-
tions the validity of age, citizenship and residency as voting requirements, see, e.g., Kramer,
395 U.S. at 625, and courts have uniformly applied the rational basis test to these require-
ments, see Evan v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 422-23 (1970).
1 See Lurie, Major Changes in the Structure of the AFDC Program Since 1935, 59
CORNELL L. REV. 325, 825 (1974). An entitlement is usually defined as a particular privilege
granted to those who fulfill the statutory requirements. See B. BRUDNO, INcoME REDISTRIBU-
TION THEORIES AND PROGRAMS 577 (1984). Whether the poor will benefit from governmental
programs that provide relief depends therefore upon the statutory requirements of the enti-
tlement. See Briar, Welfare From Below: Recipients' Views of the Public Welfare System,
54 CALIF. L. REv. 370, 375-82 (1966). A residency qualification is often one such requirement;
thus the homeless are not entitled to any public assistance when the relief statute contains a
residency qualification. See infra notes 20-35 and accompanying text. Although Brudno has
argued that an alternative definition of entitlement--"an affirmative government duty to
provide the necessities of life without which liberty is meaningless"-would qualify the
homeless for public assistance, B. BRUDNO, supra, at 577, the Supreme Court resolved this
issue by declaring that welfare assistance is not an accrued property right, see Wyman v.
Jones, 400 U.S. 309, 312 (1971); Fleming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 606 (1960).
16 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-613 (1982); 45 C.F.R. § 233.10 (1984). Aid to Families with Depen-
dent Children (AFDC) enables states to provide financial assistance to families with depen-
dent children to sustain the family structure. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-602.
17 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395pp and 1396-1396i (1982). Medicaid is a federally funded pro-
gram that provides reimbursements for medical care to individuals eligible for AFDC and
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mentary Security Income (SSI).19
To receive assistance from any of the programs except Medi-
care, a person must have some form of residence. Federal statutes
and regulations mandate that any residency requirement for state
welfare assistance be defined broadly in terms of a voluntary intent
to remain in the community indefinitely, and be based on the pre-
mise that a genuine resident of the state cannot be denied relief.21
Nonetheless, it is clear that states have designed eligibility qualifi-
cations that deny assistance to otherwise qualified residents.22 For
example, the Food Stamps Program requires that recipients be
members of a "household."2 The term "household" is not clearly
defined by the Social Security Act or the regulations promulgated
thereunder.24 However, the act appears to incorporate a require-
ment of "purchasing and preparing meals, '25 which homeless peo-
SSI and others who are "medically indigent." B. BRUDNO, supra note 15, at 520. "Medically
indigent" persons are those who do not qualify for AFDC or SSI, but would qualify if their
medical expenses were deducted from their income in determining AFDC or SSI eligibility
or "if coverage under [their state] plan was as broad as allowed under the federal law." 42
U.S.C. § 1396a(10)(A)(ii)(II)-(III). Medicare, on the other hand, provides medical care for
individuals over 65 who qualify for Old Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI), regardless of
financial need. Id. § 1395c.
"' 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2026 (1982). Congress enacted the Food Stamp Act in 1964 to en-
sure adequate nutrition in low income households. Id. § 2011. This welfare assistance pro-
gram is administered by the states under the aegis of federal agencies. See Developments in
Welfare Law - 1973, 59 CORNELL L. Rav. 859, 893 (1974).
19 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383c (1982). The Supplementary Security Income (SSI) program
provides additional income to individuals who have reached the age of 65, or are blind or
disabled. Id. § 1381. The states must adhere to minimal federal criteria when determining
the eligibility of individuals for, and the extent of, benefits. Developments in Welfare Law,
supra note 18, at 881-88. When a state does not take part in this program, see 7 U.S.C. §
1382e, the federal government will set up, administer and finance the program in that state,
see B. BRUDNO. supra note 15, at 519.
20 See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7), (8), (14); 42 U.S.C. § 1396(1); 7 U.S.C. § 2014(a), (c), (0,
(i); 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a)(2)(A)-(B) (1982); 45 C.F.R. § 233.20 (1984).
21 45 C.F.R. § 233.40(a)(1) (1984). AFDC, SSI, Medicare and Medicaid are all governed
by the federal Social Security Act. B. BRUDNO, supra note 15, at 489. The federal regulations
implementing the public welfare programs of the Social Security Act have defined the appli-
cable residency requirements. See 45 C.F.R. § 233.40 (1984).
22 See Lurie, supra note 15, at 829. The purpose of a bona fide residency requirement is
often not so much to define that category of persons eligible for public assistance as to
restrict the class of persons eligible for relief and discourage others from applying for it. Id.
For example, one purpose of residency requirements is to discourage individuals from leav-
ing the work force causing their families to rely on relief programs. Id.
23 7 U.S.C. § 2014(a) (1982); see 7 C.F.R. § 273.1 (1984).
24 See 7 U.S.C. § 2014(a) (1982); 7 C.F.R. § 273.1 (1984).
21 7 U.S.C. § 2014(a); 7 C.F.R. § 273.1(a). Section 2012(i) defines a "household" in
terms of those living in a place where one prepares meals for home consumption. 7 U.S.C. §
2012(i)(1)-(2). The regulations contain an exception for presently disabled individuals over
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ple ordinarily cannot meet. Additionally, even though publicly and
privately operated shelters arguably fit the definition of "house-
hold," residents of these institutions are denied food stamp bene-
fits. 26 The requirement that applicants live "in the project area"
serves similarly to exclude the homeless from this form of public
assistance.27 Moreover, the problem is amplified by federal food
stamp regulations that require verification of the residency and
identity of applicants. 28 Although a fixed residence and intention
to remain permanently in the community are expressly excluded
from the qualifications for eligibility29 and verification of residence,
and identity can be accomplished by "collateral contacts" rather
than by documentary evidence, 30 the federal regulations are not
broad enough to guarantee that otherwise eligible homeless will re-
ceive food stamp benefits."'
60 who cannot purchase and prepare their own food. See id. § 2012(i); 7 C.F.R. § 273.1(a). A
"household," then, would not apply to those homeless who live on the street. See 7 U.S.C. §
2012(i)(1)-(2); 7 C.F.R. § 273.1(a).
28 7 U.S.C. § 2012; 7 C.F.R. § 273.1(2); see Schneider, supra note 1, at 32. An individual
is a resident of an institution if the institution provides "the majority of [his] meals." 7
C.F.R. § 273.1(e). As a result, a homeless person who "sleeps at a shelter that provides more
than two meals a day ... will not be eligible for food stamps." Schneider, supra note 1, at
32. According to Schneider, once a homeless individual has lived in a shelter for more than
half of a month, food stamp benefits will be discontinued. Id. It is submitted, however, that
Schneider's analysis erroneously supposes that during the first half of the month a homeless
individual will receive food stamp benefits. It is submitted that this is not necessarily true
because a homeless resident of a shelter may not fulfill the statutory requirements of a
"household" and therefore not qualify for food stamps.
27 See 7 C.F.R. § 273.3.
28 Id. § 273.2(f)(1)(vi); Schneider, supra note 1, at 31.
29 7 C.F.R. § 273.3.
30 Id. § 273.2(f)(4)(i); Schneider, supra note 1, at 31. The federal regulations provide for
waiver of residency verification in instances in which verification "cannot reasonably be ac-
complished." 7 C.F.R. § 273.2(f)(4)(vi). The regulation refers specifically to migrant farm
workers as an example of a case in which residency verification would be waived. Id. Schnei-
der posits that like a migrant farm worker, a homeless person has no ties to the community
in which he lives, Schneider, supra note 1, at 31, but unlike a migrant farm worker, the
homeless' presence in the community is not so evident that they, too, would be exempt from
residency verification qualifications, id. The federal regulations also require identity verifi-
cation. 7 C.F.R. § 273.2(f)(1)(vii). Verification of both identity and residency can be accom-
plished through collateral contacts, that is, through "an oral confirmation of a household's
circumstances by a person outside of the household." Id. § 273.2(f)(4)(ii).
31 See Schneider, supra note 1, at 31. Even if verification of residency and identity were
waived, the homeless may not fulfill the residency requirement of "living in the project
area." See id. Even Schneider's exegesis of the residence requirement does not promise that
the homeless will meet this qualification:
While "living in the project area" is not defined in the rule, the rule itself provides
some guidance. The rule states that a "fixed residence" is not required and gives
an example of a migrant campsite as satisfying the residency requirement. Only
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The AFDC and SSI public assistance programs are not
designed to ensure that those without fixed and permanent legal
residence will qualify to receive aid.3 2 For a family to receive assis-
tance for a dependent child under AFDC, the child must live "with
[a specified relative] in a place of residence maintained ... as his
own home."33 Thus, a homeless family with children is effectively
denied AFDC relief.34 Additionally, the elderly, blind and disabled
are ineligible for supplementary income if they live in a "public
institution,"3 5 so that elderly homeless living in public shelters are
denied SSI assistance. It is submitted that by requiring bona fide
residence for AFDC and SSI relief, the legislative intent behind
the programs is defeated. The goal of the AFDC program is to aid
vacationers are listed as persons who are not residents of a project area. Conse-
quently, for food stamp purposes, persons living on the streets should be consid-
ered residents of the project areas in which they live.
Id. (emphasis added).
3 Compare 7 C.F.R. § 273.3 (food stamps) with 42 U.S.C. § 612 (1982) (AFDC) and 42
U.S.C. § 1382(e)(1)(A) (SSI).
- 42 U.S.C. § 607 (1982); 45 C.F.R. § 233.90(c)(1)(v) (1984). Two elements of subsec-
tiond(c)(1)(v) emphasize the need for fixed, permanent lodging- "a place of residence" and
"home." "A place of residence" is undefined by the regulations and leaves open the question
of whether temporary or emergency shelter for homeless families is included; however, the
term "home," defined as "a family setting maintained or in the process of being estab-
lished," requires fixed permanent lodging. See 45 C.F.R. § 233.90(c)(1)(v) (emphasis added);
accord Friedman, Social Welfare Legislation: An Introduction, 21 STAN. L. REv. 217, 225
(1969) (provision of Wisconsin aid to dependent children statute, "living in a residence
maintained by one or more of such relatives as his or their own home," is residency
requirement).
The foregoing discussion does not altogether deny the existence of welfare assistance for
homeless families. Temporary shelter is provided for homeless families in strictly defined
emergency situations. See, e.g., Canady v. Koch, 598 F. Supp. 1139 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (emer-
gency shelter for homeless individuals); Koster v. Webb, 598 F. Supp. 1134 (E.D.N.Y. 1983)
(same). It is submitted, however, that for those homeless families who do not qualify for
emergency shelter, other forms of relief are denied.
-1 A great deal of controversy has arisen over the "non-need factors" for eligibility for
AFDC relief, which include residency. See B. BRUDNO, supra note 15, at 595-600; Develop-
ments in Welfare Law, supra note 18, at 868-73. The issue of bona fide residency require-
ments, however, has not yet arisen in this context.
35 42 U.S.C. § 1382(e)(1)(A) (1982). According to § 1382(e)(1)(A), an individual or
spouse is not eligible for SSI assistance "with respect to any month if throughout such
month he is an inmate of a public institution." Id. Section 1382 does not define "public
institution," but excludes from its meaning "publicly operated community residence[s]
which [serve] no more than 16 residents." Id. § 1382(e)(1)(C). Because most publicly oper-
ated shelters serve many more than 16 residents, most are "public institutions."
The exclusion of public institutions as residences sufficient for SSI income eligibility is
consistent with the view that while durational residence requirements must not be imposed,
a bona fide residence requirement should be permitted. Developments in Welfare Law,
supra note 18, at 890-91 & n. 91.
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family stability.3 6 The purpose of the SSI program is to ensure that
the elderly and the handicapped have sufficient income on which
to live.3 7 It is submitted that these legislative goals cannot be
reached if the homeless and their families are denied access to
sources of welfare relief.38
Residency requirements alone do not deprive the homeless of
welfare assistance. Other incidental statutory qualifications for
welfare relief emphasize the necessity of a "bona fide" residence.
For example, a mailing address is necessary to receive food
stamps39 or medicaid and medicare.4 ° Similarly, visits to a child's
home by social service officials can be an important factor in deter-
mining whether the child will qualify for AFDC relief.41 It is sub-
mitted therefore that lack of housing denies the homeless a statu-
36 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1982); S. REP. No. 1589, 87 Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1962 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1943, 1944; Joyner v. Dumpson, 533 F. Supp. 233, 237 (S.D.N.Y.
1982); Woods v. Miller, 318 F. Supp. 510, 513-14 (W.D. Pa. 1970); accord Haceesa v. Heim,
84 N.M. 112, 113, 500 P.2d 197, 198 (1972) (state relief program)
3 See HR. REP. No. 231, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. &
An. NEWS 4989, 4992; Whaley v. Schweickes, 663 F.2d 871, 873 (9th Cir. 1981) (purpose of
SSI "is to assure that recipients' income is maintained at a level viewed by Congress as
minimum necessary for the subsistence of that individual").
" See HR REP. No. 231, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 4889. It is submitted that the fundamental question that must be asked in evalu-
ating relief programs for the poor is whether a program as structured is meeting the needs
of all of those for whom the program is intended. One such group for whom welfare relief
must have been intended are the homeless, the poorest of the poor. If welfare relief was
intended to extend to the homeless, the structure of AFDC, SSI, and other public assistance
programs must sufficiently accommodate the special circumstances of this group by elimi-
nating any qualification based on residence.
39 See 7 C.F.R. § 274.2(a) (1985) (states may issue food coupons through direct mail-out
system). But see Schneider, supra note 1, at 32. Schneider states that mailing address re-
quirements for food stamps are imposed by local agencies, and that it is illegal for the states
to place such qualifications on federal aid. See id. Indeed, Schneider suggests that most of
the problems the homeless face in regard to food stamp relief stem not from the federal
regulations, but from the "local food stamp office's misinterpretation of complex federal
rules." Id. at 31.
40 Collin, supra note 2, at 323. A homeless person has no mailing address at which to
receive welfare checks. See id. The failure to receive welfare assistance because of a lack of
mailing address is of great consequence. See id. Collin notes, "[w]ith no mailing address...
[the homeless] no longer receive public assistance checks or other mail. It is in this manner
that the detachment from society characteristic of homelessness begins." Id.
41 See Lurie, supra note 15, at 851-52 & n.133. To verify information about AFDC ap-
plicants and recipients, social service agents may visit the applicant's or recipient's home.
Id. at 851-52. The importance of this visit is highlighted by the fact that a recipient who
refuses to allow a social service agent into his home may be denied further AFDC relief. See
Wyman v. Jones, 400 U.S. 309, 324-26 (1971). It is submitted that this "simplified" method
of determining eligibility guarantees that homeless families will be denied AFDC assistance
because the social service agent has no home to visit.
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tory entitlement to public assistance.
VAGRANCY
In both England and America, vagrancy laws were originally a
means with which to deal with the threat of crime in areas of pov-
erty.42 To prevent crime, criminal sanctions were imposed on those
who were idle.43 Those who were most often idle were the poor;
hence, vagrancy laws served to punish status rather than specific
criminal conduct.44 Presently, in recognition of the Supreme
Court's rejection of statutes that impose criminal liability on the
basis of status,45 courts are rejecting vagrancy statutes, frequently
on various grounds.
46
The demise of vagrancy laws resulted in the adoption of simi-
42 See Note, supra note 8, at 755-56. In sixteenth century England, vagrants were pro-
vided with assistance by local parishes. Id. at 755 n.19. To prevent these parishes from
becoming "magnets" for vagrants, criminal sanctions were imposed against new arrivals. Id.
The same rationale has been applied more recently in the United States, see Washington
Post, Nov. 8, 1984, at A58 col. 5, when, in 1984, officials of the District of Columbia at-
tempted to block the placement of a "right to shelter" initiative on the ballot fearing that a
city that provides shelter will become a "magnet for the homeless," id.
British colonists brought the criminal aspect of vagrancy laws to America. See Note,
supra note 8, at 755 n.18. Today, these laws exist in the United States to prevent crime. See
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 161, 169 (1972); Fenster v. Leary, 20
N.Y.2d 309, 313, 229 N.E.2d 426, 429, 282 N.Y.S.2d 739, 742 (1967).
43 See Note, supra note 8, at 756.
"4 See id. at 756 n.20. Since the 1960's, many state and federal courts have sustained
challenges to the constitutionality of vagrancy statutes because they punish status rather
than conduct. E.g., Decker v. Fillis, 306 F. Supp. 613, 617 (D. Utah 1969) (vagrancy statute
that penalizes individual based on economic condition or status violates due process);
Goldman v. Knecht, 295 F. Supp. 897, 907 (D.C. Colo. 1969) (vagrancy statute violates due
process by associating poverty with criminality); Parker v. Municipal Judge of Las Vegas, 83
Nev. 214, 216, 427 P.2d 642, 643-44 (1967) (to punish poverty, rather than conduct, is viola-
tion of due process); Note, Orders to Move On and the Prevention of Crime, 87 YALE L.J.
603, 604 (1978); Comment, Constitutional Attacks on Vagrancy Laws, 20 STAN. L. REv. 782,
782-87 (1968).
" See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (criminal sanctions may
not be imposed on basis of status as drug addict).
11 See Note, supra note 8, at 756-60; 1 Pov. L. REP. 700, 709 (1974). Courts have re-
jected vagrancy statutes because they violate due process, exceed the permissible scope of
the police powers of a state or violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. See,
e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162, 165 (1972) (vagrancy statute
violates due process when it provides inadequate notice that conduct is forbidden and en-
courages arbitrary arrests); Goldman v. Knecht, 295 F. Supp. 897, 906 (D.C. Colo. 1969)
(associating poverty with criminality violates Equal Protection Clause); Fenster v. Leary, 20
N.Y.2d 309, 314, 229 N.E.2d 426, 429, 282 N.Y.S.2d 739, 743 (1967) (vagrancy statute impos-
ing criminal sanction on unemployed not reasonably related to permissible scope of state's
police powers).
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lar statutes known as loitering statutes.4 7 Loitering statutes gener-
ally permit the arrest of individuals who fail to produce "credible
and reliable" identification when their apparent aimlessness pro-
vokes the suspicion that they are about to commit a crime.48 Many
loitering statutes have been found unconstitutionally vague be-
cause they failed to give sufficient notice of the proscribed conduct
and created a potential for arbitrary enforcement.49 These difficul-
ties do not exist however in the two types of statutes that have
withstood constitutional muster-those that combine prohibitions
against loitering with prohibitions of specific criminal conduct,50
and those that forbid loitering in a particular time, place and
manner.
51
Although loitering statutes ostensibly punish criminal conduct
rather than social status, these statutes are virtually indistinguish-
able from earlier vagrancy laws.52 Indeed, it is submitted that the
47 Note, supra note 8, at 756-58.
48 E.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-703(1) (1953). The Utah loitering statute contains the
typical elements of a loitering statute:
(1) A person is guilty of loitering if he appears at a place or at a time under
circumstances that warrant alarm for the safety of persons or property in the vi-
cinity, and upon inquiry by a law enforcement official, he fails to give a reasona-
bly credible account of his identity, conduct, or purposes.
Id. (emphasis added).
4 E.g., United States ex rel. Newsome v. Malcom, 492 F.2d 1166, 1174 (2d Cir. 1974),
aff'd sub nom. Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283 (1975). A loitering statute may also
violate an individual's fifth amendment rights by requiring the individual to explain his
presence in a particular place. See Note, supra note 44, at 607 & n.28 (citations omitted).
50 Yuen v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 52 Cal. App. 3d 351, 358, 125 Cal. Rptr.
87, 92 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975) (statute penalizing loitering coupled with concealment of danger-
ous weapon is constitutional); State v. Armstrong, 282 Minn. 39, 40-43, 162 N.W.2d 357,
359-60 (1968) (law that prohibits loitering with intent to solicit prostitution is
constitutional).
"I Note, supra note 8, at 759 n.42. Loitering statutes limiting the place and/or time in
which one can, for example, enter a school or public park, have been held to be sufficiently
delimited to provide adequate notice and prevent arbitrary enforcement. E.g., United States
v. Cassiagnol, 420 F.2d 868, 872 (4th Cir.) (statute prohibiting loitering on government prop-
erty is valid), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1044 (1970); cf. People v. Velazquez, 77 Misc. 2d 749,
759, 354 N.Y.S.2d 975, 986-87 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. N.Y. County 1974) (provision proscribing
loitering in public transportation facility, if limited in place and time, would have been held
constitutional).
52 Williams, Constitutional Reflections on California's Request for Identification Law,
8 BLACK L.J. 177, 183 (1983); see Note, Kolander v. Lawson: Fourth and Inches on Fourth
Amendment Issues and Supreme Court Punts, 10 J. CoNTEMP. L. 239, 240 & n.12 (1984).
Unlike earlier vagrancy laws, loitering statutes do not include indigence as an element of the
crime. Comment, supra note 44, at 783-84. It is submitted that the effect of these statutes is
to punish the homeless, in addition to those who may actually be attempting to commit
crimes. Comment, supra note 44, at 783-84.
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loitering statutes punish the homeless, a class of persons likely to
provoke suspicion because they tend to wander the streets and loi-
ter in proscribed areas, on the basis of what they are, not what
they do. Moreover, it is probable that their apparent idleness and
inability to produce identification result from their financial condi-
tion.5 3 It is submitted that the possibility that criminal sanctions
can be imposed on the homeless merely because of their economic
status is an injustice that must be addressed by the courts and the
legislatures.
ADULT PROTECTIVE SERVICES LAWS
Although vestiges of vagrancy laws remain today in a number
of states,54 the legislatures, through the impetus of the Supreme
Court,55 have begun to recognize that criminal punishment is not
the solution to homelessness.56 However, an equally misguided ef-
fort made by several state governments has been the imposition of
adult protective services laws.5 7 Adult protective services laws per-
mit social service agencies to force the homeless intb shelters.5 8
These laws indicate a growing awareness in state governments that
the physical safety of those without shelter is threatened by harm-
ful conditions such as subfreezing temperatures. 9 Nonetheless, al-
though well-intended, adult protective service laws raise constitu-
" Cf. Schneider, supra note 1, at 31 (recognizing that homeless cannot fulfill require-
ment of documentary verification of identity for food stamp eligibility, federal regulations
provide for verification by "collateral contacts").
" See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 653(g) (West 1970); FLA. STAT. ANN § 856.021(2) (West
1976); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-36 (1984); NEv. REv. STAT § 207.030 (1981).
11 See Kolander v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 461-62 (1983); Papachristou v. City of Jack-
sonville, 405 U.S. 156, 171 (1972); Johnson v. Florida, 391 U.S. 596, 598 (1968).
58 Note, supra note 8, at 760-61. The New York State Legislature has been listening to
accounts of the plight of the homeless. Id. at 761 nn.54-55.
51 See id. at 773-81. In addition to New York, see N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 473-a (McKin-
ney Supp. 1983), four other states have enacted protective services laws, see supra note 8.
" See Note, supra note 8, at 774-75. Adult protective services laws empower social ser-
vice agencies to impose limited emergency services on needy individuals who resist aid. See
id. These agencies, however, must initiate certain legal procedures before being permitted to
impose these services. See id. By following these procedures, social service officials can, for
example, force resisting homeless into shelters while protecting themselves from legal liabil-
ity. See id.; cf. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 473-b (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985) (in 1984 state
legislature enabled private individuals to inform social service agencies that adult might be
endangered without fearing civil liability for their report).
19 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 415.101-415.111 (West Supp. 1984); Ky. REV. STAT. §§
209.010-209.150 (1982); MD. Soc. SERV. CODE ANN. §§ 106-110 (1979); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW §
473-a (McKinney Supp. 1983); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 14-25-101 to 14-25-113 (1980 & Supp.
1984); Tx. HUM. REs. CODE ANN. § 48.061 (Vernon Supp. 1985).
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tional issues involving the deprivation of individual liberty.60 It is
submitted that these statutes, although civil in action, are as un-
just as earlier vagrancy laws because both attempt to solve the
problem of homelessness by imposing sanctions on the homeless
that violate due process.
New York is one of five states that has enacted adult protec-
tive services laws.61 Recognizing the potential for the deprivation
of civil liberties,"2 the state legislature strictly limited the circum-
stances under which, and the procedures through which, social ser-
vice officials are empowered to compel protective services for an
individual. An individual must be confronted with a life threaten-
ing situation and must lack "the capacity to comprehend the na-
ture and consequences of remaining in that situation."" Social
Service officials are required to give the homeless person notice of
the imposition of the protective services and an opportunity to be
heard. 5 Services can be provided for a maximum of six days.66
Such limited relief in emergency situations has been held valid
under the due process clause.6
In drafting the protective service statutes the legislatures gen-
erally have failed to address a number of important issues, with
the result that these laws are as vague as the vagrancy statutes.68
As with vagrancy statutes, the vagueness of protective services laws
60 See Note, supra note 8, at 773-74, 775 n.122; N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1982, at Al, col. 1.
61 See, e.g., N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 473-a (McKinney Supp. 1983); see supra note 8. The
Florida Adult Protective Services Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 410.10-410.11 (West Supp. 1982),
has been challenged in the highest court of Florida and was held constitutional. In re Byrne,
402 So. 2d 383, 385 (Fla. 1981), appeal dismissed sub nom. In re Turner, 455 U.S. 1009
(1982).
62 See Governor's Memorandum on Approval of ch. 991, N.Y. Laws (July 31, 1981),
reprinted in [1981] N.Y. LAws 2641 (McKinney) (legislature sought balance between indi-
vidual's civil liberties and responsibility of state to protect life and health of citizens).
63 N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 473-a (McKinney Supp. 1983).
6 Id. § 473-a(1)(a)(ii). Individuals on whom protective services are being imposed must
be in danger of imminent death or serious physical harm, and they must be unable to com-
prehend the danger. Id. at § 473-a(1)(a)(i).
65 See id. § 473-a(10)(h).
66 See id. § 473-a(4)-(5) (imposition of services is of limited duration; three days with
possibility of further three-day extension).
67 See In re Byrne, 402 So. 2d 383, 385 (Fla. 1981) (imposition of protective services on
elderly couple incapable of caring for themselves is constitutional), appeal dismissed sub
noin. In re Turner, 455 U.S. 1009 (1982).
68 Cf. Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARv. L.
REV. 1190, 1254 (1974) (although vagueness doctrine has generally been employed with re-
gard to criminal statutes, it has also been applied to civil sanctions) [hereinafter cited as
Civil Commitment].
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means that the homeless individual is not provided with sufficient
notice that his or her conduct will result in involuntary commit-
ment.6 9 At the same time, a potential for arbitrary enforcement ex-
ists when the statute lacks clear criteria for determining whether
an individual lacks "capacity to comprehend the nature and conse-
quences of remaining in that situation or condition. '70 Beyond the
issue of statutory vagueness is the more fundamental problem of
whether the due process rights of the homeless are protected when
mentally incapacitated homeless individuals are forced into shel-
ters that are themselves places of potential danger.7 '
Apart from adult protective services laws, state and local gov-
ernments have attempted to solve the problems of homelessness
through the use of police powers.7 2 Emergency imposition of pro-
tective services based on state police power is even more threaten-
ing to the civil liberties of the homeless than the invocation of
adult services laws. 73 Police powers authorize peace and police of-
ficers to take mentally incapacitated individuals, who are incapable
of caring for themselves and who may be a danger to themselves or
60 Cf. Lessard v. Schmidt, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Wis. 1974)(person subject to state
civil commitment proceedings entitled to notice of both basis of detention and standard on
which detained), vacated on other grounds, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), prior judgment reinstated,
413 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis. 1976).
70 N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 473-a(1)(a)(ii)(a)-(b)(McKinney Supp. 1983). Neither mental
illness nor refusal to accept aid is sufficient, in and of itself, to constitute the lack of capac-
ity required for classification as an endangered adult. Id.; See Civil Commitment, supra
note 68, at 1253 (vagueness results from failure to provide guidelines restricting scope of
government officer's authority to enforce law). Limited guidelines are provided by the legis-
lature to aid the social service agency in determining whether an individual is an "endan-
gered adult."
71 See Werner, supra note 1, at 14-15.
72 See N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1985, at B3, col. 6. The homeless are placed in hospitals
against their will through the imposition of police powers. See id. In New York, for example,
the use of police powers in this context is not based on adult protective services laws, but on
the Mental Hygiene Law. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.45 (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985);
Note, supra note 8, at 779. Police powers are distinguished from the doctrine of parens
patriae, a doctrine under which the state has inherent power to protect individuals suffering
from a disability. Note, supra note 8, at 777; see also Civil Commitment, supra note 68, at
1222 (civil commitment based on societal interest rather than individual interest is
grounded in police power). Police powers carry with them connotations of criminal sanction
while parens patriae does not. See Note, supra note 8, at 777.
1 See Note, supra note 8, at 777 n.126. Associated with the use of police powers is the
possibility of civil commitment in a mental hospital. See Civil Commitment, supra note 68,
at 1222. This indicates that the use of police powers instead of adult protective services laws
poses a threat to the homeless individual's civil liberties. See Note, supra note 8, at 777
n.126.
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others, into custody for purposes of psychiatric examination.7 4 Un-
like statutory adult protective laws, the use of police power does
not require a hearing and therefore poses a greater threat of violat-
ing due process.7 5 As a result the courts have applied strict scru-
tiny to the invocation of police powers and have allowed the states
to take the homeless individual into custody without notice and a
hearing only when it is clear that no less restrictive alternative ex-
ists.7 6 Yet recently, the New York City police placed some home-
less individuals in hospitals against their will without determining
whether a danger existed.
It is submitted that state and local governments must face the
fundamental contradiction that they have created. On the one
hand, state and local lawmakers have refused to guarantee the
7' Note, supra note 8, at 777 n.126, 780-81; Civil Commitment, supra note 68, at 1228-
38; see, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.45 (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985). The underlying
purpose of police powers is to prevent criminal activity by a person who is mentally il and
potentially harmful. See Civil Commitment, supra note 68, at 1228-30. Therefore, two con-
ditions must be met before police powers can be used to commit an individual: he must be
mentally incapacitated, and dangerous to himself or others. See id.
75 See Civil Commitment, supra note 68, at 1245 n.231. Police powers threaten an indi-
vidual's due process rights for several reasons. See id. at 1228-48. The individual is deprived
of his liberty in "anticipation of future criminal behavior." Id. at 1228. Moreover, detention
is imposed without a hearing. Id. at 1245 & n.231. In addition, preventive detention of the
mentally ill may constitute an unconstitutional punishment of status. Id. at 1228-29; cf.
supra note 44 (vagrancy and loitering statutes present issue of punishment of status).
" See Civil Commitment, supra note 68, at 1223, 1245 n.231. Before police powers may
be invoked for the purpose of civil commitment, a compelling state interest must exist. See
id. Such an interest does exist when the individual endangers his own life or the lives of
others. See id. However, even in cases in which the use of police powers has been premised
on the saving of a life, only the possibility of temporary, rather than permanent, deprivation
of the individual's civil liberties has been considered. See, e.g., N.Y. MENrAL HYG. LAW §
9.39(b) (McKinney 1978) (involuntary treatment authorized for maximum of 15 days unless
longer period is judicially authorized); id. at § 21.90 (authorizes police to take individual
incapacitated by alcohol into custody for period of twenty-four hours or until condition
wanes); cf. United States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752, 753-54 (D. Conn. 1965) (saving life is
compelling consideration in decision whether to judicially order blood transfusion for Jeho-
vah's Witness). Thus, even greater safeguards are necessary to protect the due process rights
of homeless persons confronted with the possibility of civil commitment.
7 See N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1985, at B3, col. 6. Recently, Mayor Koch ordered the police
to remove the homeless from the bitter cold and place them in shelters and hospitals. Id.
Two homeless were placed against their will in city hospitals. Id. The Mental Hygiene Law
was cited as the authority for that commitment; yet the requirement that an individual be a
danger to himself or others was apparently ignored. See id. The city's action was evidently
rationalized in terms of a proposed change in the current police power requirements. See id.
Under this new legislation, police powers would permit the placement of homeless individu-
als in danger of death or substantial physical harm in hospitals. Id. It is submitted that this
proposed legislation undermines the essential due process requirement of civil commitment
and distorts a doctrine that is already under constitutional fire.
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homeless shelter. On the other, they have recognized that those
without shelter face life threatening dangers, and have enacted
adult protective service laws that violate the civil liberties of the
homeless.
LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL INACTIVITY ON BEHALF OF THE
HOMELESS
Federal, state and local legislatures have provided government
subsidies, low-cost housing, and some shelter for the poor and the
homeless.78 This legislative activity can be criticized nonetheless
because these governments have supplied this minimal aid reluc-
tantly, '9 and have failed to take steps to solve the causes of home-
7' See Werner, supra note 1, at 14-15; Note, supra note 9, at 940. Congress has held
hearings to determine what federal action is necessary on behalf of the homeless. See Home-
lessness in America: Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on Housing and Community
Dev., 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1982). The federal government has also passed legislation
providing for the distribution of $50 million to local agencies rendering aid to the homeless.
See Werner, supra note 1, at 15. State and local governments have also provided subsidies
for the homeless. For example, the Governor of New York recently proposed the collection
of funds for homeless services. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1984, at B2, col. 1.
One particular area in which federal, state, and local legislatures have provided for the
poor has been in the area of housing. See, e.g., Housing and Community Development Act
of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 633 (codified in scattered sections of 12, 15, 20, 40, 42,
49 U.S.C.); The Special Needs Housing Act, N.Y.A. 8390, 206th Sess. (1983) (legislative ac-
tivity to respond to crisis housing for homeless in New York). However, although federal
and state governments provide public housing for the poor, "[tihe historical development of
public housing in the United States has been characterized as a 'chronicle of frustration and
failure."' Comment, The Housing and Community Development Act of 1974-Who Shall
Live in Public Housing?, 25 CATH. U.L. RE V. 320, 320-22 (1976). Moreover, while state and
local governments have provided low cost housing for the poor, they are less than willing to
provide shelter for the homeless. See Brief for the National Coalition for the Homeless as
Amicus Curiae at 4 & n.4, Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 104 S. Ct. 3065
(1984); see generally Homelessness in America: Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on
Housing and Community Dev., 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 57-60 (1982) (testimony heard regard-
ing state and local inability and/or refusal to provide shelter to homeless). Indeed, the re-
sponse of local government in particular to the problem of sheltering the homeless has been
far from cooperative. See Werner, supra note 1, at 14-15. While some local governments
work together with private organizations to provide shelter, other cities either shift the re-
sponsibility to charitable organizations or do nothing at all. See id. at 15.
" See Werner, supra note 1, at 14. Federal, state and local activity on behalf of the
homeless has been chiefly characterized by a reluctance to provide aid; this reluctance is
particularly apparent in major cities. See id. The city of Phoenix, with an estimated 3300-
6200 homeless, has no shelters. Id. San Diego, which is in the process of revitalizing its
downtown area, "ha[s] been subtly urging the missions operating shelters to relocate so that
they will not spoil the renewal efforts." Id. New York City has virtually ignored a judicial
decree ordering the furnishing of shelter to all homeless individuals who apply for it. Collin,
supra note 2, at 325; see Homelessness in America: Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on
Housing and Community Dev., 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1982). But see Note, supra note 9,
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lessnessY° For example, loitering and adult protective services laws
have confronted the problem of homelessness negatively by depriv-
ing the homeless of civil liberties rather than positively by provid-
ing permanent housing, employment, and aftercare."
Future legislative activity on behalf of the homeless is unlikely
in view of a recent report by the Department of Housing and Ur-
at 946-47 (right to shelter may not be established by judicial consent decree).
80 See generally Collin, supra note 2, at 320-21, 323. The federal and state legislatures
are beginning to recognize the needs of the homeless, and have begun to allocate funds to
local agencies so that the homeless may be furnished with basic services. See supra note 78.
The problem with government corrective measures is that homelessness is not being pre-
vented. Housing, unemployment and deinstitutionalization problems must be dealt with by
government and not exacerbated by it. Thus, the federal government must work to reverse
the sociological trend away from low cost housing as well as the significant decrease in fed-
eral low cost housing subsidies that has occurred within the last five years. See Brief for the
National Coalition for the Homeless as Amicus Curiae at 10, Clark v. Community for Crea-
tive Non-Violence, 104 S. Ct. 3065 (1984) (comparing housing assistance in 1980 (26.6 bil-
lion) with that in 1984 (0.5 billion)). Government must also try to counter the effects of the
recent recession and the reduction in unemployment compensation, which "ha[ve] meant a
more rapid descent into poverty than the unemployed experienced in previous recessions,"
and "ha[ve] exposed the unemployed worker, and his family, to a greater risk of homeless-
ness than victims of earlier recessions." Id. at 11; see The Poverty Rate Increase: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Public Assistance and Unemployment Compensation of the
House Comm. on Ways and Means, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1983). Indeed, as a result of the
recession, the homeless population has "become more diverse, including increasing numbers
of skilled and educated people and large numbers of young people." Brief for the National
Coalition of the Homeless as Amicus Curiae at 11, Clark v. Community for Creative Non-
Violence, 104 S. Ct. 3065 (1984). Finally, the states must either discourage deinstitutional-
ization or provide aftercare, including shelter, for the deinstitutionalized mentally ill. See
Collin, supra note 2, at 320-21; Reich, Care of Chronically Mentally Ill-A National Dis-
grace, 130 Ai. J. PSYCHIATRY 911, 912 (1973).
Perhaps the single greatest instance of congressional exacerbation of the problem of
homelessness is the federal reduction in aid to the poor. See Reich, supra, at 912; Brief for
the National Coalition of the Homeless as Amicus Curiae at 12-13, Clark v. Community for
Creative Non-Violence, 104 S. Ct. 3065 (1984). Reduction in federal and state aid to the
poor has contributed to homelessness by forcing individuals to choose between the basic
necessities of life. For example, the poor may be forced to choose between shelter and food
when food stamp aid is decreased, and between shelter and health care when health care
and Social Security benefits are reduced. See Brief for the National Coalition of the Home-
less as Amicus Curiae at 12-13, Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 104 S. Ct.
3065 (1984) (while average earnings per family will have declined by 4% across nation dur-
ing period from 1979-1984, average welfare and food stamp benefits have declined by 14%)
(citing F. LEvY & R. MICHEL, THE WAY WE'LL BE IN 1984: RECENT CHANGES IN THE LEVEL
AND DISTRIBUTION OF DISPOSABLE INcOME 4 (1983)).
One example of federal aid reduction that has increased the frequency of homelessness
among the impoverished is the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-499, 94
Stat. 2599 (1980), which reduced numerous welfare assistance programs such as the School
Lunch Program, Medicaid and Medicare, Unemployment Compensation, and the Old Age
and Survivor's Disability Insurance Program, id. at 2599-2603, 2609-55, 2655-60.
81 See supra notes 56-71 and accompanying text.
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ban Development (HUD). 2 HUD has estimated the number of
homeless at a number far lower than the result reached by any
other statistical study.83 It is submitted that this estimate may
have the effect of thwarting any movement to aid the homeless on
federal, state, and local levels.8 4
The failure of the judiciary to address the issue of homeless-
ness stems not from a lack of initiative but rather from a lack of
opportunity and means.8 5 The homeless have traditionally lacked
access to the courts" and, as a result of the scarcity of common
and statutory law on the subject, the judiciary has been ill-
equipped to resolve those questions that have reached it.8 7 None-
82 See Shelter Operations File Lawsuit Against HUD to Recall Controversial Report
on Homeless, [12 Current Developments] Hous. & DEv. REP. (BNA) 237 (Aug. 13, 1984).
Controversy was created by a recent report issued by the department of Housing and Urban
Development estimating the number of homeless to be approximately 350,000. See id. Many
fear that this seemingly limited number of homeless will cause the public to believe that the
problem of homelessness is not significant, which could affect federal, state, and local re-
sponses to this problem. See id.
83 See id.
8 Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Pierce, filed - (D.D.C. _ ). (ac-
tion to force recall of Housing and Urban Development Report and to compel HUD to dis-
claim conclusions as doubtful).
85 See Colin, supra note 2, at 323. Until recently, the judiciary has not played an active
role in the problem of homelessness. See id. However, the courts cannot initiate litigation in
the area of homelessness; instead they must await the development of law that creates "le-
gally enforceable rights [and] duties" for the homeless. Id. The judiciary must also wait
until the homeless gain access to the courts to challenge the legal rights and privileges de-
nied them because they lack shelter.
88 See id. It is only within the last fifteen years that the homeless have had access to
the courts. Id. Recently, the homeless have been taking greater advantage of the courts,
particularly because of the growth of organizations like the National Coalition for the
Homeless and the Community for Creative Non-Violence (CCNV). Id. For example, CCNV
is primarily responsible for organizing the homeless to demand a right to shelter, see N.Y.
Times, June 29, 1984, at A28, col. 1 (setting up "Reaganville" tents in Lafayette Park to
protest lack of shelter), and for the Supreme Court challenge of the denial of the right of
homeless persons to sleep in a national park as symbolic speech, Clark v. Community for
Creative Non-Violence, 104 S. Ct. 3065 (1984); see generally Note, First Amendment Pro-
tection of Ambiguous Conduct, 84 COLUM. L. Rzv. 467 (1984) (argument for permitting first
amendment protection of conduct such as sleep which is normally not symbolic but which
may become symbolic in view of actor's message).
8'7 See Colin, supra note 2, at 323, 326 (lack of homelessness cases give courts little
guidance in few cases they get). The courts have little common law or statutory guidance for
determining issues such as whether the homeless have a right to shelter or a right to vote.
See id. However, the courts have overcome these difficulties by drawing analogies to other
areas of law. See, e.g., Pitts v. Black, No. 84 Civ. 5270 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 1984)(available on
LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (strict scrutiny applies to bona fide residency just as it did
to durational residency); Caton v. Barry, 500 F. Supp. 45, 48-49 (D.D.C. 1980) (past conduct
of government gives homeless property interest in shelters and entitlement to notice and
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theless "[1]itigation has become the preferred tool of advocacy
groups working to improve conditions for the homeless,"' 8 and the
courts are now more willing to recognize their role in this area even
though it may involve them in questions of social policy. 9 Indeed,
it is through the courts that the right to shelter was created, 90 the
right to vote guaranteed, 91 and the right to notice and a hearing
before the closing of a homeless shelter was provided.2
While the judiciary has been the most effective channel for in-
fluencing government policy in the area of homelessness, it alone
cannot bring about the broad changes necessary to eliminate
homelessness. To achieve these changes, the homeless need a polit-
ical voice.
GUARANTEEING THE HOMELESS THE RIGHT TO VOTE
Homeless have been denied the right to vote because they lack
a "bona fide residence,"9 3 an essential qualification for voting. This
hearing before shelter is closed).
" See Note, supra note 9, at 940. Organizations for the homeless such as the Coalition
for the Homeless, headed by attorney Robert Hayes, and the Community for Creative Non-
Violence, in Washington, D.C., have used litigation to gain rights for the homeless. See
Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 104 S. Ct. 3065 (1984); Callahan v. Carey,
N.Y.L.J., Dec. 11, 1979, at 10, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County).
89 See Seide v. Prevost, 536 F. Supp. 1121, 1125 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). One way courts ad-
dress homelessness issues when faced with a dearth of statutory and common law is by
looking at social policy. See id. The courts are generally discouraged from becoming policy-
makers, but in the area of homelessness such a role is at times necessary:
While the impropriety of judges determining social policy is frequently
sounded by those with loud trumpets, nonetheless, in the context of the needs of
the homeless and the mentally disturbed, it is the court that must decide the is-
sues brought before it and seek to achieve a just result and do so promptly.
Id.; see also BAM Historic Dist. Ass'n v. Koch, 723 F.2d 233, 236 (2d Cir. 1983) (historical
association sought injunction to prevent city from operating shelter in renovated commu-
nity; injunction denied as against public interest in housing homeless); Blackshear Residents
Org. v. Romney, 472 F.2d 1197, 1198 (5th Cir. 1973) (per curiam) (injunction preventing low
cost housing contrary to public interest).
o See infra notes 126-129 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 107-122 and accompanying text.
92 See Caton v. Barry, 500 F. Supp. 45, 48-49 (D.D.C. 1980).
" See Pitts v. Black, No. 84 Civ. 5270 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 1984) (available on LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist file); Committee for the Dignity and Fairness for the Homeless v.
Tartaglione, No. 84 Civ. 3447 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 14, 1984). Thus far, there have been only three
challenges to "bona fide" residence requirements. See Tartaglione, No. 84 Civ. 3447 (Phila-
delphia); Black, 84 Civ. 5270 (New York); Silas, Alley Voters, 70 ABA J. 37 (1984) (Wash-
ington, D.C.). Since most states have some form of fixed, permanent legal residence voting
requirement, see Brief for the National Coalition for the Homeless as Amicus Curiae at 35,
Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 104 S. Ct. 3065 (1984), it is probable these
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residency requirement serves two important purposes: it helps pre-
vent fraud94 and ensures that the voter becomes a part of, and thus
has a stake in, the political community in which he votes.9 5 How-
ever, the test employed to determine whether a person is a bona
fide resident-the maintenance of a fixed, permanent legal resi-
dence-creates problems for the homeless.9 6 By defining bona fide
residence in this manner, state legislatures have imposed an eco-
nomic restriction on voting by excluding those who cannot afford
housing.9 7 Yet, because the residency requirement has been subject
to only minimal scrutiny,98 the fixed and permanent lodging test
has been held valid until recently.99
three decisions will encourage challenges to residency requirements in other states.
" Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 346 (1972); Pitts v. Black, No. 84 Civ. 5270
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 1984)(available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file). In Dunn, the Su-
preme Court left open the question of whether the state interest in preventing fraud was a
compelling one. See 405 U.S. at 343, 356. Nonetheless, in Black, Judge Lowe recognized the
prevention of fraud as a compelling state interest that is furthered by a bona fide residency
requirement. See Black, No. 84 Civ. 5270.
11 See Black, No. 84 Civ. 5270. While rejecting a durational residency requirement, the
Dunn court noted that an appropiately defined and uniformly applied requirement of bona
fide residence may nonetheless be required to ensure that the compelling interest of each
state that its citizens have a stake in the political community is protected. See 405 U.S. at
343-44. Rejecting the fixed, legal permanent lodging test in Black, Judge Lowe agreed that a
uniform test of bona fide residence is needed to preserve the basic concept of a political
community. Black, No. 84 Civ. 5270.
11 See Pitts v. Black, No. 84 Civ. 5270 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 25, 1984) (available on LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist file) (permanent injunction and declaratory judgment to prohibit appli-
cation of election laws in such a way as to disenfranchise homeless). Bona fide residency has
not been rejected in those cases in which the homeless challenge a denial of the right to
vote. See id.; Committee for the Dignity and Fairness for the Homeless v. Tartaglione, No.
84 Civ. 3447 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 14, 1984); N.Y. Times, May 1, 1984, at A28, col. 1. However, in
each instance the "fixed and permanent lodging" test has been redefined.
9 It is submitted that requiring an individual to have a fixed and permanent legal resi-
dence is as much an economic restriction on voting as the requirement of property owner-
ship, or a poll tax. See infra notes 100-103. In each case, those who cannot afford to meet
the statutory qualifications are denied the right to vote, even though voting statutes con-
taining a bona fide residency test do not appear on their faces to draw economic lines of
demarcation. Id. While "[t]he states ... are prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause
from discriminating between 'rich' and 'poor' as such in the formulation and application of
their laws," Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 361 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting), state
statutes must also avoid covert discrimination between the two groups. Thus, it is submitted
that when a state law contains a "built in opportunity for the rich to receive a different
treatment than the poor," Davis v. Page, 618 F.2d 374, 386 (5th Cir. 1980), as in an election
law containing a bona fide residence requirement defined in terms of fixed and permanent
legal residence, the statute must be deemed unconstitutional.
98 See Note, State Restrictions on Municipal Elections: An Equal Protection Analysis,
93 HARv. L. REv. 1491, 1496 (1980).
" See Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 422 (1969); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 91
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The Supreme Court has eliminated most economic require-
ments for voting, including property ownership 00 and the poll
tax.10 1 According to Justice Douglas in Harper v. Virginia State
Board of Elections, "wealth or fee paying has . . .no relation to
voting qualifications; the right to vote is too precious, too funda-
mental, to be so burdened or conditioned."'' 0 If the practical effect
of the fixed and permanent lodging test is to place an economic
limitation on the right to vote103 it is submitted that the Supreme
Court's acceptance of the traditional test of bona fide residency
cannot be reconciled with the Court's rejection of the property
ownership and poll tax requirements.
As recently as 1980, the Supreme Court took the position that
the legislature has no responsibility to "equalize the condition" of
the poor.10 4 A government, according to the Court, has no duty to
remove economic obstacles that prevent the poor from enjoying
(1965); cf. Lassiter v. Northhampton Election Bd., 360 U.S. 45, 50 (1959) (states have broad
powers to determine conditions under which right to vote may be exercised).
100 See Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204, 208-09 (1970); Cipriano v. City of Houma,
395 U.S. 701, 704-06 (1969); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 622
(1969). An ownership of property requirement has been rejected by the Supreme Court as
an unconstitutional restriction on voting. See Kramer, 395 U.S. at 622. In only one limited
instance will such a restriction withstand constitutional scrutiny. when an election has a
narrow, unique purpose and disproportionately affects a group of property owners. Compare
Salyer Land Co. v. Tulane Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 721-25 (1973)
(franchise limited to agricultural landowners when sole election issue was water storage and
irrigation of farmlands) with Kramer, 395 U.S. at 623 (interest in local school district elec-
tion not limited exclusively to those who own property or who have children that attend
school in district). For an argument that the Salyer Land Co. decision was inconsistent with
other Supreme Court decisions holding property ownership requirements unconstitutional,
see Comment, A Case Study in Equal Protection: Voting Rights Decisions and a Plea for
Consistency, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 934, 953 & n.102 (1976).
101 Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666, 668-69 (1966) (poll tax
invidiously discriminated against poor citizens).
102 Id. at 670.
103 See Pitts v. Black, No. 84 Civ. 5270 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 1984)(available on LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist file) (request for preliminary injunction against New York City and
State boards of elections refusing to allow homeless to register to vote). The plaintiffs in
Black based their claim for a preliminary injunction on the premise that by defining resi-
dency in terms of "occupancy of a fixed premises [the election boards] have made a consti-
tutionally impermissible distinction between those who occupy premises primarily intended
for residential purposes and those who do not." Black, No. 84 Civ. 5270. Thus, the underly-
ing premise of the claim of the homeless, it is submitted, is the invalidity of an economic
restriction on voting which distinguishes between those with residence and those without
residence.
104 See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469-71
(1977); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 447 (1977).
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fundamental rights. 10 5 At the same time, however, the highest
court also has stated that the legislature may not place economic
barriers in the path of an individual who wishes to exercise a fun-
damental right. 06 It is submitted that the states have actively pre-
vented those without shelter from exercising their fundamental
right to vote by defining "bona fide" residence in terms of a fixed,
permanent, legal residence.10 7 Only by redefining the individual
state tests of bona fide residency can the obstacles imposed by
state legislatures on the franchise be overcome.'
State legislatures will not feel compelled to create better tests
of good faith residency if the traditional tests continue to be
weighed against a rationality standard 09 It is submitted that strict
scrutiny should be used to judge bona fide residency requirements.
This argument is supported by the fact that recognized economic
restrictions on voting, as well as durational tests of residency," 0
have been subject to this standard."' Recently, in Pitts v. Black," 2
101 See Note, supra note 9, at 965. In Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980), the Su-
preme Court addressed the issue of whether the government had to provide welfare benefits
for abortions. Id. at 312. The Supreme Court held that although all individuals have a con-
stitutional right to choose to undergo an abortion, the state does not have to subsidize the
abortion. Id. at 318. The fact that individuals are poor and therefore incapable of exercising
a fundamental right does not impose any obligation on the government. See id.
100 Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316-17 (1980).
107 In creating fixed and permanent legal residence tests, it is submitted, state legisla-
tures have not merely refused to provide the economic means necessary for the homeless to
exercise the franchise, but have affirmatively prevented them from voting.
1o See, e.g., Committee for the Dignity and Fairness for the Homeless v. Tartaglione,
No. 84 Civ. 3447 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 14, 1984) (to fulfill residency requirements, homeless may
register at street corners and benches, as well as shelters with which they have established
relationship and which accept first class non-forwardable mail); N.Y. Times, May 1, 1984, at
A28, col. 1 (homeless in District of Columbia may designate local home and mailing address
for residence requirement).
1'9 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
110 See supra notes 100-102 and accompanying text. In rejecting both ownership of
property and imposition of a poll tax as qualifications for voting, the Supreme Court found
that these restrictions served no compelling state interests. See Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399
U.S. 204, 205-07 (1970); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 705 (1969) (ownership of
property); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 622 (1969); Harper v.
Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) (poll tax).
" Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 337 (1972). The durational residency qualification,
which imposes a time restriction before which a bona fide resident may vote, is subject to
strict scrutiny as well. See id. Durational residence was an earlier form of the test of bona
fide residence. See Comment, Applying Equal Protection to Bona Fide Residence Require-
ments, 59 IOWA L. REv. 671, 672-76 (1974).
"I No. 84 Civ. 5270 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 1984) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist
file). The district court had granted a preliminary injunction to the plaintiffs in Pitts v.
Black, No. 84 Civ. 5270 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 1984) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist
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the federal district court for the Southern District of New York
applied a stricter standard to a New York election law that re-
quired voters to show fixed, permanent legal residence. 113 The
court held that because this test of bona fide residence completely
disenfranchised the homeless, it was unconstitutional as applied." 4
In Black, a group of homeless individuals brought a class ac-
tion against the New York city and state election boards to enjoin
permanently the boards from applying New York State Election
Law sections 1-104, 5-102 and 5-104 in state and city elections. 1 5
The plaintiffs argued that the traditional definition of residence
denied those without shelter equal protection of the law." 6 The
plaintiffs offered an alternative definition of bona fide residence:
"the act of being in one geographical locale, where one performs
the usual functions of sleeping, eating, and living in accordance
with one's life style, and a place to which one, wherever tempora-
rily located always intends to return. 11 7
Writing for the court, Judge Lowe stated that restrictions on
the fundamental right to vote must undergo strict scrutiny." ' Ap-
plying this standard, the court reasoned that although the fixed
and permanent lodging test served to prevent fraud and to ensure
an individual's stake in the political community, less restrictive
file).
" No. 84 Civ. 5270 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 1984) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist
file).
224 Id.
",l Id. The homeless plaintiffs sought a permanent injunction and a declaratory judg-
ment to prohibit application of the New York State Election Law "in such a manner as to
[render them] completely disenfranchise[d]." Id. The specific provisions of the state election
laws under scrutiny in Black were New York Election Law §§ 1-104, 5-102, and 5-104. Sec-
tion 1-104 provides that residence is "that place where a person maintains a fixed, perma-
nent and principal home and to which he, wherever temporarily located, always intends to
return." N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 1-104 (McKinney 1978). Sections 5-102 and 5-104 add the re-
quirements that voter registration cannot take place unless an individual is a "resident." Id.
§§ 5-102(1) and 5-104(2).
", No. 84 Civ. 5270 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 1984).
117 Id. The fixed and permanent lodging test could be redefined, the plaintiffs argued,
in the less rigid terms of "domicile." See id. Domicile requires only that the focus of one's
existence be in a geographical locale, rather than in a particular lodging. See id.; N.Y.
Times, Sept. 11, 1984, at A18, col. 1 (since homeless fulfill "domicile" requirements like
other citizens, they also fulfill residence requirement).
118 See No. 84 Civ. 5270 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 1984); N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1984, at Al8,
col. 1. Judge Lowe argued for the strict scrutiny standard at the hearing for the preliminary
injunction. See Pitts v. Black, No. 84 Civ. 5270, at 15 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 1984). The ration-
ale for this stricter standard was the same as that applied by the Dunn Court with regard to
durational residency. See id. at 13.
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procedures and sanctions exist to protect these state interests."'
The court adopted a new test that required the homeless to iden-
tify "a specific location within a political community which they
consider their 'home base,' to which they return regularly, manifest
an intent to remain for the present, and a place from which they
can receive messages and be contacted . . ,. o Judge Lowe noted
that alternative eligibility procedures for the homeless consistent
with the new test of bona fide residence had already been estab-
lished in Philadelphia and Washington, D.C.
121
Although the New York district court has been the only court
to adopt a new definition of bona fide residence to date, the need
for a new test is evidenced by the growing number of challenges to
state residency qualifications that deny the homeless the
franchise.1 22 It is submitted that the residence test adopted in
Pitts will serve two purposes: first, it will act as a model for the
redefinition of bona fide residence requirements in other contexts,
such as public assistance. Second, and more significantly, it will
guarantee the homeless a political voice with which they can chal-
lenge the denial of welfare assistance, the imposition of loitering
and adult protective services statutes, and demand a statutory
right to shelter.
119 No. 84 Civ. 5270 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 1984). Signature verifications, return of registra-
tion notice and criminal sanctions are a few alternative ways that the New York city and
state boards of election could prevent voter fraud. Id. A mailing address at a local shelter
should be sufficient to meet the requirement that the homeless be part of, and have a stake
in, the political community. See id.
120 Id. When the district court redefined bona fide residence in terms of an intent to
remain in a geographical locale, it evidently adopted the definition of residence stated in
Ramey v. Rockefeller, 348 F. Supp. 780, 788 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), and in Palla v. Suffolk County
Bd. of Elections, 31 N.Y.2d 36, 47, 286 N.E.2d 247, 252, 334 N.Y.S.2d 860, 866.
12 See Pitts v. Black, No. 84 Civ. 5270 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 1984). The new test of bona
fide residence which calls for a "home base" and a "means by which the homeless individual
can be contacted" is satisfied by residency requirements fpr the homeless in Washington,
D.C., and Philadelphia. See id. The Washington, D.C., board of elections requires a specifi-
cally identified location and a mailing address; the Philadelphia elections board requires a
shelter for homeless that accepts "first-class non-forwardable mail." Id.
122 The District of Columbia board of elections evaded review by the district court by
reaching its own decision on the disenfranchisement of the homeless. See Resky, A Right to
Live, A Right to Vote, N.Y. Times, Aug. 29, 1984, at B6, col. 4. In New York and Philadel-
phia, on the other hand, the plaintiffs were compelled to resort to the district courts. See
Pitts v. Black, No. 84 Civ. 5270 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 1984); Committee for the Dignity and
Fairness for the Homeless v. Tartaglione, No. 84 Civ. 3447 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 14, 1984).
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THE RIGHT TO SHELTER
To guarantee the homeless the right to vote, the courts of
Philadelphia and Washington, D.C. redefined the test of bona fide
residence so that the homeless could register their park benches,
street corners and local shelters as their residences. 12 3 The registra-
tion of such places to fulfill residency qualifications, it is submit-
ted, underscores the existence of a more fundamental problem that
must be addressed by federal and state legislatures and the judici-
ary: the lack of a right to shelter.'24 Although the Supreme Court
has explicitly refused to find a right to shelter in the Constitu-
tion, 25 it is submitted that the creation of a constitutional or fed-
eral statutory right to shelter is not inconsistent with the Constitu-
tion. Indeed, several authors have argued that a right to shelter is
implicit in the third, fourth, fifth, and fourteenth amendments,
each of which protects the individual from deprivation of his prop-
erty. 26 An argument also has been advanced that the Constitution
is dynamic rather than static in nature, and therefore permits the
development of new rights, such as housing, in accordance with the
needs of a changing nation. 27 Perhaps the most cogent argument
for a constitutional right to shelter for the homeless was that of-
fered by Justices Brennan and Marshall.12s These justices argue
that a right to shelter must be implied within the Constitution if
the exercise of another fundamental constitutional right depends
123 See supra notes 120-121.
124 See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
125 Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972). In Lindsey, although the Supreme Court
recognized the importance of adequate housing, it argued that it had no constitutional basis
on which to establish a right to shelter. Id.
126 See Steinberg, Adequate Housing for All: Myth or Reality?, 37 U. PiT. L. REv. 63,
68 (1974); Comment, Towards a Recognition of a Constitutional Right to Housing, 42
UMKC L. REv. 362, 362 (1974). A reading of the Constitution suggests that the founding
fathers recognized the importance of an individual's home. See Comment, supra, at 362. For
example, the third amendment forbids the quartering of soldiers in any house; the fourth
amendment secures one's home against unreasonable search and seizure; and the fifth
amendment prohibits deprivation of one's property. See id.
127 See Comment, supra note 126, at 363. The Supreme Court recognized at an early
date that the Constitution did not embody all the rights that are guaranteed to individuals.
See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (Constitution outlines rights
guaranteed to individuals). A flexible Constitution is necessary to approach and resolve the
"various crises of human affairs." Id. at 415 (emphasis added). It is submitted that the lack
of decent housing is one such "crisis of human affairs" for which a constitutional resolution
must be found. See Steinberg, supra note 126, at 65.
12 See San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 62-63 (1973) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); id. at 102-13 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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upon an individual having adequate housing.12 9 This argument is
particularly important for the homeless, since their fundamental
right to vote generally is denied because of their lack of adequate
housing.
A right to shelter is also consistent with federal, state and lo-
cal activity in the area of housing.130 Through the United States
Housing Act of 1937 and its amendments, 31 the federal govern-
ment has attempted to ensure that all Americans have adequate
housing. 3 2 State and local housing authorities have followed the
federal government's lead by establishing housing codes and regu-
lations.' Moreover, in the District of Columbia, an initiative that
would require the city to provide shelter to any District resident
was recently placed on the ballot."3
129 See id. at 62-63 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 102-13 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Certain non-constitutional rights play an important role in the protection of constitutional
rights. See id. at 62-63 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 102-13 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Justices Brennan and Marshall argue that the more essential the non-constitutional right is
to the constitutional right, the greater the need for the government to guarantee that non-
constitutional right. See id. at 62-63 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 102-13 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). The arguments of Justices Brennan and Marshall are at odds with the Supreme
Court's view of the federal, state, and local governments' responsibility to protect the funda-
mental rights of the poor. See supra notes 104-105.
130 See Steinberg, supra note 126, at 72-73.
:S 42 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1436 (1970).
1 See id. The United States Housing Act of 1937 ("the Act") was the first federal
attempt to confront the great need for decent and adequate housing in this country. Staff
Project: The Tenant Selection Process in Public Housing in Kansas City, Missouri, 46
UMKC L. REV. 507, 539 nn.183-184 (1978). The goal of the Act and its amendments was to
provide adequate housing for all Americans. See id. at 539. The Housing Act of 1949
provides:
The Congress hereby declares that the general welfare and security of the
Nation and the health and living standards of its people require. . . the realiza-
tion.. . of the goal of a decent home and a suitable living environment for every
American family.
Housing Act of 1949, Pub. L. 171, ch. 338, 63 Stat. 413. It is submitted that it is difficult to
reconcile this goal with the reluctance of the federal government to secure decent housing
for the homeless.
1 See, e.g., Staff Project, supra note 132, at 528-32 (establishment of public housing
authority in Kansas City, Missouri); see Steinberg, supra note 126, at 72-73. The creation of
a constitutional or statutory right to shelter is consistent with indication of concern at all
three levels of government for the plight of the homeless. See id. Contra Michelman, The
Advent of a Right to Housing: A Current Appraisal, 5 HARv. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 207, 211-13
(1970) (panoply of housing acts are not promises to public to achieve ideal welfare state of
housing for all needy).
' See Washington Post, Nov. 8, 1984, at A58, col. 5; Washington Post, Oct. 24, 1984,
at C1, col. 6; Washington Post, Aug. 2, 1984, at C3, col. 4. The initiative proposed enactment
of the D.C. Right to Overnight Shelter Act, which now requires the District of Columbia to
provide shelter for the homeless that is "'accessible, safe and sanitary and has an atmo-
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In spite of the Supreme Court's resistance to establishing a
federal constitutional right to shelter, individual state courts have
guaranteed this right to state and local residents.135 The New York
Supreme Court has guaranteed a state constitutional right to shel-
ter in Callahan v. Carey.3 6 However, since this right is based on
the New York State Constitution,137 the court's rationale in Calla-
han is not binding on other state courts. 38 Nonetheless, West Vir-
ginia courts have found authority for guaranteeing shelter to the
homeless in state social services laws. 139
sphere of reasonable dignity.' "See Washington Post, Nov. 8, 1984, at A58, col. 5. This act is
the first instance of legislative activity to guarantee the homeless the right to shelter. See
N.Y. Times, May 1, 1984, at A28, col. 1.
231 See Hodge v. Ginsberg, 303 S.E.2d 245, 250 (W. Va. 1983); Callahan v. Carey,
N.Y.L.J., Dec. 11, 1979, at 10, col. 4 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. County Dec. 10, 1979). A right to shelter
has been established judicially in New York City, Los Angeles, and Charleston, West Vir-
ginia. See Washington Post, Nov. 8, 1984, at A58, col. 5.
131 N.Y.L.J., Dec. 11, 1979, at 10, col. 4. In Callahan, the New York Supreme Court for
New York County issued a consent decree finding that the destitute "are entitled to board
and lodging" and setting forth the minimum standards necessary to guarantee homeless
men the right to shelter in New York City. See id. The resistance of the city to the court's
decision led to the Callahan Decree, an agreement between the city and state and the
homeless plaintiff which provided:
that sanitary and safe shelter and board be supplied to a homeless man who ap-
plies for it as long as the man meets the need standard to qualify for home relief
established in New York State or the man, by reason of physical, mental, or social
disfunction, is in need of temporary shelter.
Id. The right to shelter set forth in the Callahan Decree has been extended to homeless
women in New York. See Eldredge v. Koch, 118 Misc. 2d 163, 459 N.Y.S.2d 960 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County), rev'd on other grounds, 98 App. Div. 2d 675, 676, 469 N.Y.S.2d 744, 746 (1st
Dep't 1983).
However, New York City has persisted in ignoring the judicial mandate in spite of the
Callahan Decree, see Collin, supra note 2, at 325, even though the city faces a dilemma
when the temperature drops and the homeless face the threat of severe physical injury and
death, see N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1985, at B3, col. 6. It is submitted that if the city were to
comply with the requirements of Callahan, it would not have to compel the homeless into
shelters in sub-freezing temperatures.
237 See Collin, supra note 2, at 324. In Callahan, the supreme court found support for a
right to shelter in the requirement of the state constitution that New York provide "aid,
support and care of the needy." See id.; cf. Koster v. Webb, 598 F. Supp. 1134, 1137
(E.D.N.Y. 1983) (constitutional provision providing for aid, care and support of needy guar-
antees homeless families emergency shelter). This constitutional provision imposed an af-
firmative duty on the state to care for those the state classified as needy. See Tucker v.
Toia, 43 N.Y.2d 1, 8, 371 N.E.2d 449, 453, 400 N.Y.S.2d 728, 731 (1977).
In See Hodge v. Ginsberg, 303 S.E.2d 245, 250 (W. Va. 1983).
131 See id. at 250.51. The Supreme Court of Appeals held that those without permanent
residence are "incapacitated adults" within the meaning of West Virginia's adult protective
services laws, so that the homeless could compel the Department of Welfare to provide shel-
ter for them. Id.
It is interesting to compare the offensive use of adult protective services laws by the
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Once the homeless gain the right to vote, their political re-
sources will undoubtedly be directed toward compelling the state
and federal governments to guarantee a right to shelter. 140 The im-
portance of this right must not be minimized because it is inextri-
cably intertwined with another problem of the homeless: the right
to aftercare.' A large percentage of the homeless are mental pa-
tients, who, because of social reform and the reduction of govern-
ment spending, have been deinstitutionalized without having been
provided with aftercare. 142 Indeed, the importance to the homeless
of a political voice becomes increasingly apparent on examination
of the many problems and deprivations they face.
CONCLUSION
Homelessness is a problem that has virtually been ignored by
the legislative and judicial systems in America. Indeed, even when
the legislature and judiciary have attempted to solve the problem,
their lack of commitment to what would be a real solution, a statu-
plaintiffs in Hodge with the defensive use of such laws by state and local governments. See
supra notes 54-77 and accompanying text. The homeless plaintiffs in Hodge sought to take
advantage of protection provided by the state; they were not being compelled. See 303
S.E.2d at 250.
140 See N.Y. Times, May 1, 1984, at 28, col. 1. The political voice of the homeless has
begun to develop now that they have been guaranteed the right to vote in Washington, D.C.,
Philadelphia, and New York City, and now that they have begun to make use of political
channels such as publicity and moral pressure. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying
text. The recent D.C. Right to Overnight Shelter Act initiative evidences this group's grow-
ing political influence. The measure was overwhelmingly approved by the voters of Wash-
ington, D.C., most of whom could not have been the recently enfranchised homeless. Wash-
ington Post, Nov. 8, 1984, at A58, col. 5 (109,000 voters approved "Initiative 17").
Placement of the D.C. Right to Overnight Shelter Act on the ballot is also important
because it suggests that the homeless will use their political influence first to gain a statu-
tory right to shelter. Indeed, this is necessary because most of the difficulties experienced by
the homeless are caused by their lack of a fixed, permanent legal residence.
141 Rhoden, supra note 3, at 415-16. One major cause of homelessness is deinstitutional-
ization. Collin, supra note 2, at 320-23. Approximately 20-50% of the homeless suffer from
mental disability. Id. Social reformers saw deinstitutionalization as a means of returning to
the community mental patients who did not require constant care; the government regarded
it as a means to cut spending. Id. at 318-20. Returning discharged mental patients to the
community, however, did not guarantee them housing or aftercare. Id. at 320 (community
resistance is one cause of displacement); Note, supra note 9, at 949. According to Rhoden,
the problems of housing and aftercare are inextricably intertwined. Rhoden, supra note 3, at
415-16. "The rise in homelessness among the mentally ill graphically illustrates the fact that
their need for housing cannot be divorced from their need for mental health treatment...
." Id. See generally Note, supra note 9, at 949 (homeless, mentally ill and right to aftercare
discussed in relation to doctrines of parens patriae, right to treatment, and entitlement).
142 See Collin, supra note 2, at 320-21; Rhoden, supra note 3, at 415-16.
RIGHTS OF THE HOMELESS
tory right to shelter, has produced absurd and contradictory re-
sults. It is difficult to understand how the neediest of the
poor-the homeless-are ineligible for many forms of welfare assis-
tance. Yet, perhaps more incomprehensible are the civil and crimi-
nal sanctions imposed on the homeless through vagrancy, loitering,
and adult protective service laws. If shelter were guaranteed to the
homeless, these laws would be unnecessary. Equally, the vote, the
only source of political influence by which the homeless could
change their situation, is also denied to them because they have no
fixed and permanent residence.
The fixed and permanent lodging test for the voting require-
ment of bona fide residency invidiously discriminates against those
who cannot afford housing. When an arbitrary test contains a
built-in means of eliminating a group's fundamental rights because
of the group's economic status, the test is unconstitutional. The
fixed and permanent lodging test can be rejected simply because a
less restrictive alternative definition of bona fide residence is avail-
able. But the fundamental importance of voting and the fragile
predicament of the homeless require more rigid scrutiny of the re-
jected discrimination. Economic restrictions must be rejected as
the prerequisite for obtaining rights in the United States or the
poor, particularly the homeless, will be left oht in the cold.
"A poor person is not just a person who is lacking the eco-
nomic wherewithals-he is also poor if he lacks power. This is a
fundamental issue in the whole problem of poverty. '143
Maria L. Ciampi
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